Introduction
Five Cents examines Somalia’s New Security Test: whether the new African Union mission, backed by UN logistics and hybrid financing, can turn international support into accountable Somali security. We’ll look at what changed after ATMIS, who is responsible for the handover, and the signs that would show real progress. The place to start is with what AUSSOM is meant to be.
What is happening
AUSSOM, the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia, replaced ATMIS on January first, twenty twenty-five. It is not simply a renamed force. Its purpose is to support Somali authorities against Al-Shabaab and affiliated Islamic State groups, while Somali security institutions take on more responsibility.
That distinction matters. An international mission can help plan operations, protect key routes, and provide military support. But it cannot, on its own, create durable security. The intended end point is Somali forces that can deploy, supply themselves, protect communities, and answer to civilian institutions.
The UN-backed framework adds a new financing and support structure. AUSSOM is led by the African Union, not commanded as a conventional UN peacekeeping force. But the UN Support Office in Somalia, known as UNSOS, provides essential logistics: transport, supplies, operational hubs, and support for joint or coordinated Somali operations.
The funding model is hybrid. UN-assessed contributions are meant to provide a more predictable base, while the African Union and partners raise additional voluntary funding. That is an improvement on a mission dependent almost entirely on donor pledges. But it is not a guarantee. Estimates put AUSSOM’s annual needs at about one hundred sixty-six point five million dollars. Part of that requirement still depends on funding that has not been fully secured.
So the first test is simple
So the first test is simple: can this system sustain operations long enough to make a handover possible? Funding gaps affect more than budgets. They can delay troop reimbursements, reduce patrols, limit mobility, and leave recovered areas without the support needed to stay secure. The second test is whether Somali forces are genuinely taking over, rather than operating beside AUSSOM indefinitely.
The Somali National Army, police, intelligence services, regional forces, and local authorities all have roles. The difficult work is integration: reliable pay, clear command structures, shared intelligence, functioning supply chains, and coordination between the federal government and federal member states.
That is why troop numbers alone can mislead. A force may be large on paper but still struggle to hold territory if commanders compete, salaries arrive late, ammunition is poorly managed, or units depend on foreign air support, medical evacuation, and logistics. The mission’s operating idea is often described as clear, hold, and build.
First, armed groups are pushed out. Then Somali forces and police must keep the area secure. Finally, civilian administration, justice, roads, markets, schools, and health services need to return. The final stage is where military gains become political reality. If a town changes hands but residents cannot travel safely, settle disputes, access services, or trust local authorities, armed groups can regain influence.
Security is not just the absence of fighters
Security is not just the absence of fighters. It is the presence of institutions people can use. Civilian protection is therefore another hard measure of success. Operations should reduce harm, enable humanitarian access, and include credible investigations when abuses are alleged. UN support is subject to human-rights safeguards designed to prevent assistance from reaching units credibly implicated in serious violations.
That can slow or complicate military support, especially when vetting or investigations are needed. But it is not an optional extra. A transition that strengthens forces without accountability risks replacing one form of insecurity with another. Politics also shapes the military outcome. Somalia’s federal system means security cannot be directed effectively from one office in Mogadishu alone. Regional authorities, local administrations, and communities need to see the transition as legitimate.
Otherwise, parallel chains of command and disputes over recovered territory can undermine the very forces meant to stabilize it. There is a timetable too. AUSSOM is authorized through the end of twenty twenty-six, and the UN, African Union, and Somali government are expected to assess progress against transition benchmarks.
Meanwhile, the UN’s political presence is moving toward a country-team model. That adds pressure to prove that Somali institutions can absorb more responsibility without losing political coordination, human-rights monitoring, or support for local governance. The framework’s supporters argue that Somalia still needs a reliable backstop while its forces develop.
Its critics worry that underfunding
Its critics worry that underfunding, fragmented institutions, and weak accountability could turn a transition into another extension of external dependence. Both views point to the same evidence: not battlefield claims, but whether Somali forces can hold areas, civilians become safer, and public institutions return.
The real measure of AUSSOM will be capability transfer, not the length of its mandate. Stable financing matters because it keeps the mission functioning. Accountable Somali institutions matter because they determine whether it can eventually leave. To explore this further, you can generate Five Cents episodes on Somalia’s Federal Security Challenge and Al-Shabaab’s Changing Strategy. And with that, you're up to speed in a few minutes.