Introduction
In Five Cents, we're exploring what Europe can do without the United States, and where acting independently would still mean accepting limits, costs, or delays. We'll look at defence, digital technology, trade, energy, and diplomacy. We’ll separate capabilities Europe already has from those it would struggle to replace. The starting point is what, exactly, American support is being removed. Without American political backing is one scenario. Without American military assets is another. Losing access to American technology or trade would be a much broader disruption.
Europe might negotiate an agreement despite Washington's opposition
Europe might negotiate an agreement despite Washington's opposition, yet struggle to sustain a major military operation without U.S. intelligence and logistics. So independence isn't a single status a continent either has or lacks. The useful test is whether Europe can perform a particular task, at the required scale, for long enough. Being able to begin an operation isn't the same as being able to sustain it.
We also need to distinguish Europe from the European Union. The EU provides a shared market, common trade policy, and regulatory powers. Armed forces largely belong to national governments, while European defence includes NATO members outside the EU.
These arrangements offer substantial resources, but they don't produce one decision-maker. A factory, a military unit, or a national budget becomes part of a collective capability only when countries agree how to use it. That matters practically. Fragmented purchasing can leave countries with equipment that's harder to maintain together. Political disagreement can delay action, even when resources exist.
Defence makes this distinction particularly clear. European countries have armed forces, weapons manufacturers, and experience operating together. The problem isn't an absence of military power. It's the uneven availability of capabilities that make that power usable at scale. Intelligence helps identify threats. Air-to-air refuelling keeps aircraft operating farther from home. Strategic airlift moves personnel and heavy equipment. Communications and command systems allow forces to coordinate.
Europe has capabilities in these areas, but important dependencies on American support remain. Joint work on air and missile defence, artillery, satellite services, and transport can reduce those gaps. However, ordering equipment isn't the same as fielding trained crews, maintaining supplies, and sustaining operations. A limited mission and a prolonged, high-intensity campaign place very different demands on the same forces.
Technology presents a similar contrast between expertise and scale
Technology presents a similar contrast between expertise and scale. Europe has researchers, manufacturers, and the ability to set rules for companies serving its market. But regulation cannot, by itself, replace cloud infrastructure, advanced computing capacity, or the services businesses already use.
Switching providers involves moving data, adapting software, and checking that alternatives meet operational requirements. Semiconductor capacity is also an ecosystem, not simply a factory. Design, manufacturing equipment, production, and packaging all matter.
Europe can invest in more of that ecosystem and expand its digital options. It cannot assume that European expertise means every essential service has a European substitute ready to deploy. For businesses and public institutions, the practical goal is dependable alternatives and the ability to switch, rather than a promise that every component will be produced locally.
Trade, energy, and diplomacy show where Europe already has substantial room to act. The EU can negotiate market access collectively and maintain commercial relationships beyond the United States. Its large market gives it leverage, but replacing a major trading partner would still disrupt customers, suppliers, and investment.
Energy is another case where diversification matters more than a claim of complete independence. In twenty twenty-four, imports supplied about fifty-seven percent of the EU's energy needs. Norway was the largest supplier of imported natural gas, while the United States led supplies of imported liquefied natural gas.
More domestic renewable generation can reduce fuel imports
More domestic renewable generation can reduce fuel imports, but changing suppliers alone doesn't remove import exposure. Diplomatically, the EU can use sanctions, trade agreements, and partnerships without American backing. Yet most common foreign-policy decisions require unanimity, so disagreement among member states can constrain how quickly those instruments are used.
The main mistake is treating reduced reliance as total separation. American trade, technology, and energy supplies are relationships as well as vulnerabilities. Replacing them with another external supplier may change the dependency rather than eliminate it.
Equally, adding up European national resources doesn't prove they can all be deployed together. Any serious proposal needs to specify the task, the missing capability, the time required, and who will coordinate delivery. Arguments for greater autonomy emphasise resilience and freedom to choose. Arguments for continued cooperation emphasise shared capabilities and the costs of duplication. Those goals can overlap. Stronger European capacity need not require severing partnerships.
Europe can already act independently in important areas. Its toughest constraints are specific capabilities, supply dependencies, and agreement among governments. Greater autonomy means making more choices feasible, not becoming self-sufficient in everything. To explore this further, you can generate two new Five Cents: Europe's Defence Supply Chain and Switching Away from American Cloud Services. And with that, you're up to speed in a few minutes.